International Law Studies - Volume 72
The Law of Military Operations : Liber Amicorum Professor Jack Grunawalt
Michael N. Schmitt (Editor)

xv
Shooting Down Drug Traffickers

Phillip A. Johnson

T

HIS IS THE STORY of how a United States statute, enacted to combat
sabotage of commercial airliners by terrorists, produced the completely
unintended result of shutting down a major element of coalition counterdrug
operations in South America for seven months. It is also the story of how the
United States Government solved that problem, but left unresolved significant
international law issues concerning the use of force against civil aircraft
suspected of drug trafficking.

Coalition Counterdrug Operations
There is no doubt that international drug trafficking causes significant harm
to the United States. Illicit drug use by more than a million U.S. citizens creates
crime and other serious social and public health problems, and the huge illegal
profits generated by illicit drug trafficking present a threat to the integrity of
financial institutions and public officials. As bad as the drug problem may be for
the U.S., it is infinitely worse for the nations where illicit drugs are produced,
processed, and transported. The wealth and extreme violence of drug gangs'
have corrupted and intimidated public officials, distorted national economies,
denied the governments of these nations effective control over their borders
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and large areas of their territory, and in some cases provided direct support for
armed rebellions.
A number of nations in the Caribbean and in Central and South America,
which together supply much of the illicit drugs entering the US., have agreed
to cooperate with the United States in coalition counterdrug operations. With
U.S. support, they have carried out some very significant drug suppression
operations, including crop eradication, destruction of processing facilities,
interference with the supply of precursor chemicals, interruption of
transportation networks, seizure of drugs, confiscation of funds, and arrest,
prosecution, and punishment of offenders. The United States has provided
funds, equipment, training, technical advice, transportation, and intelligence
to the effort. Host nations rely on such support to carry out operations
involving direct confrontation with suspected traffickers, such as arrest,
search, and seizure. Our personnel are limited to a support role out of respect,
in part, for host nation sovereignty, which traditionally carries with it a
monopoly on the exercise of police and military power within its borders. The
restrictions are also a product of a broader policy against involving U.S. military
units in arrests and seizures, whether in foreign nations, on the high seas, or
within US. territory.1
For example, in a number of nations, US. military forces have provided and
operated ground,based and aerial radar and communications interception
facilities, the information from which has been supplied to the host nations.
This information has been used to spot suspected drug trafficking flights and
determine their routes and schedules, locate airfields, identify aircraft
(sometimes leading to identification of their crew members and owners), force
aircraft to land or to leave the nation's airspace, or execute an "end,game" in
which host nation police or military forces have carried out raids on airfields
and other facilities. In a statement to Congress on 10 March 1994, the
Department of Defense "drug czar" said that a shift in counterdrug policy
toward operations in the "source nations" would result in increasing this type of
US. support to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, which were three source nations
who had demonstrated the political will to combat narcotics trafficking. 2
By early 1994, both Colombia and Peru had announced that they intended
to shoot down suspected drug trafficking aircraft whose pilots ignored
directions to land. On 1 May 1994, the United States stopped providing
intelligence to Colombia and Peru concerning suspected drug trafficking
flights. There were reports that the Departments of Defense and State
vehemently disagreed on the wisdom of this action, but there appears to be no
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dispute that the reason for this change in policy was centered on issues of
domestic and internationallaw.3

The Domestic Criminal Law Issue

u.s.

The
domestic law problem had its origin in the Montreal Convention,
which was concluded 23 September 1971 as a measure to combat terrorism
against civilian airliners. Each contracting State is obligated to either prosecute
or extradite persons found in its territory who are accused of placing bombs on
civil aircraft or of damaging or destroying such aircraft. Under the Montreal
Convention, a State has jurisdiction to prosecute an offender (1) when the
offense was committed in its territory, (2) when the offense was committed
against or on board an aircraft registered in that State, (3) when the aircraft on
board which the offense was committed lands in its territory with the alleged
offender still on board, or (4) when the aircraft was leased to a lessee which has
its permanent place of business in that State. The Convention requires each
Contracting State to make certain offenses punishable under its domestic
criminal law "by severe penalties."4
In satisfaction of this obligation, and acting partly in reaction to the August
1983 Soviet shoot~down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (KAL 007), Congress
enacted the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, which, inter alia, makes it a crime to
damage or destroy a civil aircraft registered in a country other than the United
States.s Since 1956 it has been a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 32 to commit similar
acts against aircraft registered or operated in the United States. The material
provisions of the Aircraft Sabotage Act were codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3 2 (b) (2).
After Peru and Colombia announced their shoot~down policies, officials in
several agencies became concerned that 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(2) might make
military members and other government officials and employees subject to U.S.
criminal prosecution if they supplied intelligence information or other
assistance to a foreign government knowing that the government concerned
intended to use it to shoot down civil aircraft. Ultimately, the Deputy Attorney
General wrote to the Deputy National Security Adviser that it was
"imperative" to cut off the supply of the radar information.6 The analysis
underlying this position is stated in a 14 July 1994 memorandum from the
Department ofJustice's Office of Legal Counsel, the conclusions of which can
be briefly summarized as follows:
(1) 18 U.S.c. § 32 (b) (2) was intended by Congress to 'apply
extraterritorially. This is clear from its language, from the prior existence of a
separate statute that prohibited similar acts within the territory of the United
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States, and from the statute's purpose, which was to satisfy U.S. obligations
under the Montreal Convention.
(2) The statute applies to government actors, including law enforcement
officers and military personnel of foreign countries such as Colombia and Peru.
(3) U.S. Government personnel who supply intelligence to another
government with reason to believe it will be used to commit violations of 18
U.S.C. § 32(b) (2) may be subject to prosecution as an aider or abettor under 18
U.S.c. § 2(a) or as a conspirator under 18 U.S.C. § 371.
(4) If a death results, the death penalty or life imprisonment may be
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 34.
(5) No exemption was provided in the statute for military members or other
U.S. Government officers or employees, or for law enforcement, intelligence,
or national security activities. 7
This concern for the possible criminal liability of U.S. officials, including
military members, seems to have been the primary motivation for the cutoff of
radar generated information on 1 May 1994. The Governments of Peru and
Colombia objected strongly, 8 and the reaction of members of Congress was no
less heated. The chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere and of the Subcommittee on International
Security-both members of the President's party-denounced the
Administration's position as "absurd."9 The Administration's effort to obtain
passage of remedial legislation was greatly hampered by the strongly held
opinion among many Congressmen that 18 U.S.c. § 32 (b) (2) was never
intended to apply to coalition counterdrug operations, and that Congress had
more important things to do than to pass a remedial statute to satisfy the
Administration's overcautious approach to the problem. In any event,
however, Congress enacted Section 1012 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995,10 which provided for a drug
interdiction exemption once the President makes certain determinations. This
provision is codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2291-4, which reads in part:
Official Immunity for authorized employees and agents of the United States
and foreign countries engaged in interdiction of aircraft used in illicit drug
trafficking
(a) Employees and agents of foreign countries
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be unlawful for
authorized employees or agents of a foreign country {including members of the
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armed forces of that country) to interdict or attempt to interdict an aircraft in
that country's territo~ or airspace if(1) that aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in
illicit drug trafficking; and

(2) the President of the United States, before the interdiction occurs,
has determined with respect to that country that (A) interdiction is necessary because of the extraordinary threat
posed by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of that
country; and

(B) the country has appropriate procedures in place to protect
against innocent loss of life in the air and on the ground in
connection with interdiction, which shall at a minimum include
effective means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of
force directed against the aircraft.
(b) Employees and agents of the United States
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be unlawful for
authorized employees or agents of the United States (including members of the
Armed Forces of the United States) to provide assistance for the interdiction
actions of foreign countries authorized under subsection (a) of this section. The
provision of such assistance shall not give rise to any civil action seeking money
damages or any other form of relief against the United States or its employees or
agents (including members of the Armed Forces of the United States).

On 1 December 1994, the President signed Determination of President No.
95,7, "Resumption of U.S. Drug Interdiction Assistance to the Government of
Colombia/'ll in which he made the necessary determinations under the
statute. On 8 December 1994, a similar determination was signed for Peru. 12
The United States promptly resumed providing radar information to Colombia
and Peru, and it is reported that in 1995 Peru and Colombia seized or destroyed
thirty,nine aircraft carrying drugs, driving drug traffickers to rely almost
exclusively on land and water means of transport in those countries.13
This seems to be a happy ending, but fans of this legislative fix should take
careful note of its two major limitations, both of which were clearly quite
intentional. First, it does not apply to nations for which the necessary
Presidential determinations have not been made. For example, in May 1995
the Mexican government announced that its military aircraft would be used to
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"intercept" aircraft suspected of transporting cocaine through Mexican
airspace. 14 Both Mexican policy in this area and u.s. military support for
Mexican counterdrug operations are in their formative phases, and only time
will tell whether Presidential determinations will be sought for Mexico or other
nations. The second major limitation is that the statutory exception applies
only when the aircraft intercepted "is reasonably suspected to be primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking." If a host nation uses U.S. intelligence or
other assistance to shoot down civil aircraft for any other purpose, such as
enforcement of other criminal laws, no exception to the application of 18
U.S.C. § 32 (b) (2) would appear to be available.
This entire episode demonstrates once again the Iron Law of Unintended
Consequences, as a statute enacted for an indisputably worthy purpose turns
out to have unfortunate and wholly unintended consequences when its plain
language is applied in unforeseen circumstances. 15

International Law Issues
The principal international law issue is the question of when-if
ever-force can be used against civil aircraft. The Chicago Convention of
1944, which established the legal framework for international civil aviation,
contains only one reference to the relationship between State aircraft and civil
aircraft-Article 3 (d) provides that the contracting States must operate their
state aircraft with "due regard" for the safety of civil aircraft. 16 There is strong
support for the view that this provision is merely declarative of customary
international law, but as with most invocations of customary international law,
there have been sharp differences of opinion as to its practical application.
The positions taken by various nations in response to a number of
post,World War II incidents in which scheduled airliners were fired upon
indicate a majority view that there is an international legal obligation not to
use force against civilian airliners in international service, but that this
obligation is subject to the inherent right of self,defense recognized in Article
51 of the UN Charter. The right of self,defense, however, is strictly limited by
the principles of necessity and proportionality, and every reasonable
precaution must be exhausted in order to avoid the loss of life. These
precautions include communicating with the aircrew to divert it away from
sensitive areas, escorting it out of national airspace, requiring it to land,
or-as a last resort-firing warning shots. When Bulgaria shot down an El Al
airliner in 1955, Israel shot down a Libyan airliner over the Sinai in 1973, the
Soviet Union crippled a Korean airliner in 1978, and the Soviet Union
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destroyed KAL 007 in 1983, their actions were all roundly condemned. In each
case, there appeared to be an international consensus that the actions taken
were not justified as self,defense. 17
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was created by the
Chicago Convention to serve as a policy forum for its member nations and as a
mechanism to promote technical cooperation for the conduct of international
civil aviation. After military aircraft of the Soviet Union shot down KAL 007
on 13 August 1983, killing its 269 passengers and crew, the resulting
international outrage led to the unanimous adoption by the 152,member
International Civil Aviation Organization of a new Article 3 bis to the Chicago
Convention, intended to more specifically address the existence of an
international legal obligation to refrain from using force against civil aircraft:
(a) The contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting
to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of
interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be
endangered. This provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the
rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

(b) The contracting States recognize that every State, in the exercise of its
sovereignty, is entitled to require the landing at some designated airport of a civil
aircraft flying above its territory without authority or if there are reasonable grounds
to conclude that it is being used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this
Convention; it may also give such aircraft any other instructions to put an end to
such violations. For this purpose, the contracting States may resort to any means
consistent with relevant rules of intemationallaw, including the relevant provisions
of this Convention, specifically paragraph (a) of this Article. Each contracting State
agrees to publish its regulations in force regarding the interception of civil aircraft.
(c) Every civil aircraft shall comply with an order given in conformity with
paragraph (b) of this Article. To this end each contracting State shall establish
all necessary provisions in its national laws or regulations to make such
compliance mandatory for any civil aircraft registered in that State or operated
by an operator who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in
that State. Each contracting State shall make any violation of such applicable
laws or regulations punishable by severe penalties and shall submit the case to its
competent authorities in accordance with its laws or regulations.
(d) Each contracting State shall take appropriate measures to prohibit the deliberate
use of any civil aircraft registered in that State or operated by an operator who has his
principal place of business or permanent residence in that State for any purpose
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inconsistent with the aims of this Convention. This provision shall not affect
paragraph (a) or derogate from paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Article. IS
The United States has not yet ratified Article 3 bis, and the number of
ratifications is stUl well short of the 102 needed to bring it into effect.
Nevertheless, there is strong support for the view that it is merely declarative of
existing customary international law. 19
There are two distinctly different views concerning whether or not the
obligation stated in Article 3 bis to refrain from using weapons against civil
aircraft in flight remains subject to a right of self,defense. One view-that the
obligation not to use force is subject to no exception for self,defense-is
expressed in various ICAO publications. ICAO regularly issues a number of
publications that, while not legally binding in themselves, are some evidence of
the member States' understanding of applicable international law. For
example, there is an ICAO publication entitled International Standards-Rules
of the Air (Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation). This
publication contains provisions adopted by the ICAO Council from time to
time, acting in a "quasi,legislative function," which creates an expectation that
contracting States will comply within their territories with the standards
approved by the Council unless they file a "difference" concerning particular
rules. 20
Appendix 1 to the Rules of the Air provides standard visual signals for use
when civil aircraft are intercepted by State aircraft. Appendix 2 contains the
following provision, which was added as-Amendment 27 to the Rules of the Air
by vote of the ICAO Council on 10 March 1986:
1. Principles to be observed by States
1.1 To achieve the uniformity in regulations which is necessary for the safety
of navigation of civil aircraft due regard shall be had by Contracting States to the
following principles when developing regulations and administrative directives:
a) interception of civil aircraft will be undertaken only as a last resort;
b) if undertaken, an interception will be limited to determining the
identity of the aircraft, unless it is necessary to return the aircraft to its
planned track, direct it beyond the boundaries of national airspace, guide it
away from a prohibited, restricted or danger area or instruct it to effect a
landing at a designated airdrome;
c) practice interception of civil aircraft will not be undertaken;
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d) navigational guidance and related information will be given to an
intercepted aircraft by radiotelephony, whenever radio contact can be
established, and
e) in the case where an intercepted civil aircraft is required to land in
the territory overflown, the aerodrome designated for the landing is to be
suitable for the safe landing of the aircraft type concemed.21
This provision has been controversial. The United States and a number of
other members have stated that they consider this action by the ICAO Council
to be ultra vires, in that Article 3 (a) of the Chicago Convention states clearly
that the Convention applies only to civil aircraft, and not to state aircraft.
When the Council adopted the language, the U.S. informed the ICAO
Secretary General that it disapproved of Amendment 27 on this basis. The
majority view in the ICAO Council, however, was that the provision in Article
3 (d), requiring member States to operate their state aircraft with "due regard"
for the safety of civil aircraft, provided authority for the adoption of
Amendment 27. 22
Other ICAO publications are prepared by the Secretariat and are only
advisory in nature. Among these are a Manual Con~erning Safety Measures

Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft
Operations,23 and a Manual Concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft.24 The
latter publication describes in considerable detail the circumstances in which
interception may occur (including a suspicion that an aircraft is transporting
illicit goods) as well as detailed discussions of radio signals, flight plans,
publication of information about restricted areas, position reporting systems,
radar identification, enhancement of visual markings, procedures to be
followed when radio communications fail, procedures for interception, and
related topics. A reminder is included that intercepted aircraft may not
comply with the instructions given by ground controllers or by intercepting
aircraft because of confusion, inability to interpret visual signals correctly,
linguistic misunderstanding of radio messages, hypoxia, or because of inability to
comply due to malfunction, hijacking, or inadequate fuel. Finally, advice is given as
to the action to be taken by the intercepting pilot in the event of noncompliance:
4.1.2.16 In the event that an intercepted aircraft fails to respond to repeated
attempts to convey instructions by visual signals or radiotelephony, the
intercepting aircraft should continue to observe the intercepted aircraft until it
lands or leaves the restricted or prohibited airspace. A full report on the incident
should then be submitted to the appropriate authority to the State of registry for
action (see 2.10, Article 3 bis).25
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Any mention of the possibility of firing a weapon at a nonresponsive aircraft
is conspicuously absent from this publication. This is fully consistent with the
published views of the former Director of the ICAO Legal Bureau, Dr. Michael
Milde, who has written that an intercepting aircraft may use reasonable force
to enforce compliance by an intercepted aircraft, but not if it involves the use of
weapons against it. 26 One presumes this means that a display of force, including
the firing of warning shots, forms the outer permissible limit of "reasonable
force," and that weapons fire directed at a noncomplying aircraft will always be
c;leemed to exceed "reasonable force."
A resolution adopted by the ICAO Council in response to the destruction
by Cuba of two u.S.,registered civil aircraft on 24 February 1996 prOVides
further support for the view that there is an absolute prohibition against firing
weapons at civil aircraft. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:
THE COUNCIL

2. REAFFIRMS the principle that States must refrain from the use of weapons
against civil aircraft in flight and that, when intercepting civil aircraft, the lives of
persons on board and the safety of the aircraft must not be endangered;

4. REAFFIRMS its condemnation of the use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight as being incompatible with elementary considerations of humanity, the
rules of customary international law as codified in Article 3 bis of the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, and the Standards and Recommended Practices
set out in the Annexes to the Convention;27

When they adopted this resolution, the members of the ICAO Council may
have intended to reaffirm the view that the prohibition against using weapons
against civil aircraft is not subject to any exception such as self,defense. On the
other hand, they may have decided the issue of self,defense was not fairly raised
by the facts of the incident, and therefore it need not be discussed. Cuba
maintained that it had acted "in defense of its sovereignty,,,28 but it was clear
that the previous acts of the Brothers to the Rescue in Cuban territory, the
most egregious of which apparently consisted of dropping subversive leaflets,
were not much of a threat to Cuban national security. Furthermore, there was
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no evidence that the planes that were attacked by Cuba had, during that
particular flight, engaged in such conduct, and they appear to have been
outside of Cuban territorial airspace at the time of the attack.
The view that the obligation to refrain from using force against civil aircraft
is subject to at least one exception-the inherent right of self,defense-is
supported by the broad language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter29
and by the second sentence of paragraph (a) of Article 3 bis: "This provision
shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of
States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations." The sentence appears to
have been added to the text expressly to make it clear that Article 51 applies. It
is also interesting to read the various commentaries on the Soviet shootdown of
KAL 007; none of them take the absolute position that there could never be a
right to fire weapons in self,defense against a civil aircraft. Rather, they go to
some lengths to demonstrate that there was no factual basis for any argument
that the shoot,down was necessary, and that obvious alternatives that would
have avoided innocent loss of life were not exhausted.3D
The U.S. statute authorizing assistance to countries who have adopted a
shoot,down policy can be read as relying on the rationale of self,defense. This
view is supported by the requirement that the President find, inter alia, that
there is an "extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to the national
security of that country." The international law doctrine of self,defense,
however, does not provide a particularly good fit for the drug shoot,down
problem, for the following reasons:
• First, there has been a long,standing controversy about whether the right
to use force in self,defense can exist in the absence of an armed attack. This
argument usually arises in connection with anticipatory or preemptive
self,defense, but it clearly has considerable force when the issue is whether
force can be used against aircraft that in most cases have not displayed or used
armed force, and are not expected to do so.
• Second, while the drug problem as a whole may pose an extraordinary threat
to the national security of a country, it will probably be hard to argue that any
individual aircraft flight presents the sort of urgent danger that has traditionally
been considered necessary to trigger the right to use force in self,defense.31
• Third, the offenders typically are not members of the armed forces of
another nation, or even armed agents as envisaged in the term
"state,sponsored terrorism.'132 While drug traffickers have cozy relationships
with the governments of a number of nations, they are not generally operating
as proxies for those governments in the execution of national policy. They are
criminals, not actors, on the international political scene.
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In fact, the law of international civil aviation, including Article 3 his, will not
apply at all to many shoot,down incidents when the traffickers are nationals of
the nation shooting them down, when their aircraft are not registered in another
nation, and when their flights do not cross national borders. International law
regulates the conduct of nations in their dealings with one another and with each
other's nationals, property, and corporations. With the limited exception of
human rights law, international law does not attempt to regulate a nation's
dealings with its own citizens. The negotiating history of Article 3 his makes it
quite clear that it is intended to apply only to "foreign aircraft" and not to aircraft
of a state's own registration engaged in purely domestic traffic. 33 For such flights,
the primary law to be applied is the nation's domestic law, including its law
governing the permissible use of force against a fleeing suspected felon. 34 Where
an aircraft does not display any registration number or flag and does not
otherwise communicate any claim to be registered in another nation or to be
engaged in an international flight, it would be hard to quarrel with a presumption
by the local authorities that it is a domestic flight.
It is also clear that foreign civil aircraft are generally subject to the criminal
law of any nation in whose territory they operate. The primary international
law question is-how domestic criminal law can be practically enforced against
foreign aircraft. 35 The ultimate issue becomes whether Article 3 his and
customary international law prevent law enforcement authorities of a nation
from using weapons against foreign aircraft in its territory even though such use
of force is authorized under its domestic law.
A nation's interests in a law enforcement situation differ markedly from those
involved in a border intrusion. When a nation is primarily concerned with ending
an isolated unauthorized intrusion into its territorial airspace, that interest is
served if the intruder departs. In a drug trafficking situation, the nation's interest in
suppressing persistent drug trafficking is not served by simply escorting individual
aircraft out of its territory, especially if that was the aircraft's intended destination.
Reliance on enforcement actions by the aircraft's state of registry will in most cases
be fruitless. The result may be that the nation concerned may have no practical
enforcement option except to shoot down the suspected drug trafficker. It appears
to this author that an attempt to apply Article 3 his and customary international
law in a manner that deprives nations of any practical remedy adequately serving
their vital interests is doomed to failure.
The international community should also recognize that the use of force
against civil aircraft involved in drug trafficking does not necessarily threaten
the safety of legitimate civil aviation. Drug traffickers generally operate
unregistered aircraft, or obscure any identifying markings. They typically file no
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flight plans, refuse to communicate with ground controllers or intercepting
aircraft, and disregard instructions to land at designated airfields. So long as the
pilot of an innocent aircraft complies with ICAO standards in these areas, it will
be perfectly safe from attack by a nation that follows procedures of the sort
whose existence the President must certify under the U.S. statute. The greatest
contribution of the statute may tum out to be that it requires both the U.S. and
the nations it assists to focus on these precautions.
Accordingly, the most promising approach to understanding the
international law issues raised by the use of weapons against drug trafficking
aircraft appears to be a law enforcement perspective, rather than a self,defense
analysis. If a nation's domestic law permits using force against a suspected drug
trafficking aircraft that refuses to comply with instructions from an
intercepting aircraft, and if it observes rigorous precautions against mistakenly
attacking innocent aircraft, the use of force in these circumstances should be
regarded as legitimate.
In support of this conclusion, one could argue further that the language of
Article 3 bis to the effect that the phrase "This provision shall not be interpreted as
modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of
the United Nations," not only preserves the right of nations to use force in
self-defense, but that it also preserves their immunity from outside interference in
"matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" as
guaranteed in Article 2 (7) of the Charter. The administration of criminal law
within a nation's borders has traditionally been considered such a matter.
Additionally, there is very little likelihood that a nation adopting a policy of
shooting down drug trafficking aircraft will be subject to serious criticism or
sanctions from the international community. Drug traffickers have no vocal
champions among the family of nations, and the interests of legitimate civil
aviation will not be threatened as long as appropriate precautions are in place.
In fact, there appears to be no record to date that any nation has protested the
shoot,down policies adopted by Peru and Colombia, or the assistance provided
to them by the United States. The only event likely to precipitate such a protest
would be a ghastly mistake in which a planeload of innocents is blown out of
the sky.

~~ Thatever one may think of the urgency of solving the domestic law

WWissues raised by the U.S. policy of assisting other nations which

shoot down drug trafficking aircraft, they appear to have been solved by the
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1994 statute codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2291,4. The intemationa11aw issues raised
by a drug shoot,down policy are still unsettled, but such a policy should be
accepted as a legitimate law, enforcement measure so long as rigorous
precautions are in place to prevent the loss of innocent life.
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